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INTRODUCTION 
The study of misinformation blossomed with the work of Elizabeth Loftus in the 1970s, 
looking, for example, at how the presence of information in leading questions overshadowed the 
existing memory of a car crash. Loftus and Palmer (1974) first used the term misinformation 
effect and found a connection between language and episodic memory. At first, this term only 
referred to when participants were asked to recall an event when prompted by a biased question, 
and their memory of the misinformation was measured. Quickly there grew two types of 
misinformation effect, one in which the misleading information is presented before the event 
occurs as ‘priming’ the individual ((Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz & Cook, 2012), and 
one in which the biasing information is presented afterwards, as in the original study.  More 
recently, Dalal, Diab and Tinsdale (2015) applied misinformation to hiring decisions in the use 
of rumors by employers, a specific type of misinformation. This study was groundbreaking for 
misinformation research as it showed the effect could impact not just declarative memory but 
person judgements as well. While many variables have been studied with respect to 
misinformation effects on memory, there has been very little work focused on the influence of 
misinformation on personal judgements and feelings. 
One of the variables shown to influence the misinformation effect on memory is beliefs, 
which can be formed before or during the experiment. Anderson, Lepper and Ross (1980) 
discovered that misinformation persists even after it has been discredited because of what they 
termed belief perseverance.  This belief perseverance effect can sustain the misinformation 
effect, as rumors that have been contradicted or proven unreliable will often continue to 
influence judgments. Other belief effects occur when subjects hold prior beliefs. Lewandowsky 
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et al. (2012) found that preexisting beliefs also have the effect of increasing belief in 
misinformation, especially if the misinformation aligns with those beliefs. 
Another interesting misinformation moderator is the time elapsed since exposure to the 
misleading information. Appel and Richter (2007) observed that the passage of time increased 
the amount of misinformation participants remembered and believed. This incubation effect on 
misinformation is contingent on the timing of the delay. Appel and Richter (2007) presented 
their misinformation just before a filler period and found that this increased the magnitude of the 
misinformation effect. Dalal et al. (2015), however, used a filler task before exposure to 
misinformation and found that the accurate information presented earlier was more likely to 
resist the misinformation under these conditions than when the misinformation followed 
immediately.  
In memory formation, larger gaps between witnessing the event and being exposed to 
misinformation about the event saw more participants including the misinformation in their 
account of the events. This was hypothesized to be because the memory is recalled and 
reencoded without deliberate memorization (Appel & Richter, 2007).  Loftus (1979) found that 
participants who resisted misinformation on important details of a case (identity of suspect) were 
more likely to later resist misinformation on unimportant details (color of object). Conversely, 
participants who were influenced by the important misinformation were later more prone to also 
accepting more minor misinformation.  Pena, Klemfuss, Loftus and Mindthoff (2017) found that 
the plausibility of the misinformation was also a significant moderator of the effect. As 
predicted, participants were significantly less likely to incorporate the misleading information 
into their memories if it was highly implausible than if it was plausible. Overall, allowing 
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participants to have more time to study accurate information, or less reason to believe the 
inaccurate information,  decreases the misinformation effect.  
Skowronski (1989) found that negative information has a disproportionate impact on 
person judgments compared to positive and neutral information. This effect has been explained 
by the psychological phenomenon negativity bias, where subjects place more emphasis on 
negative information, opinions, and facts than positive information of the same weight. 
Skowronski (1989) suggested that the negativity bias in person judgments occurs because it is 
more evolutionarily advantageous to remember negative information about a person, as it can be 
relevant to personal safety. However, this negativity bias can be especially problematic for 
people when negative misinformation is provided. Turner (2003) found that rumors or gossip, a 
specific form of misinformation, are often seen in a negative light, even if the rumor is framed as 
a positive. The researchers were attempting to examine what could be done to make the target of 
gossip be seen in a positive light but expanded to scrutinize conditions under which perpetrators 
of gossip could be seen in either a negative or positive light. Turner (2003) suggested that for 
future research, instead of using the word gossip or rumor, to frame it more neutrally as to avoid 
negativity bias in any following research. The admittedly scant evidence suggests that the same 
memory effects shown in the classic misinformation effect studies are paralleled by influences 
on personal judgement. 
An untested possible parallel between memory misinformation and personal judgment 
misinformation is the effect of plausibility. In memory tests of the misinformation effect, few 
studies have varied the plausibility on the misinformation, and each has significant limitations in 
terms of clarifying the potential carryover to personal judgments. Marsh, Meade, and Roediger 
(2003) first stumbled upon plausibility effects while studying how well people understood where 
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they received information and recalled explicit memory. Their study required participants to read 
fictional stories that contained a plot and characters like a normal story, but also general 
knowledge facts chosen from Nelson and Narens (1980) general knowledge norms. Having read 
the correct facts in the story provided by the researchers, the participants still attributed correct 
answers to prior knowledge. When questioned, they recognized that it was plausible that they 
had only read the correct answer recently (Marsh, 2003). This study, while innovative, barely 
yielded statistically significant results and spoke more to the amount of misinformation given to 
the participant than the plausibility of the misinformation. Hinze, Slaten, Horton, Jenkins and 
Rapp (2014) tried to replicate and clarify the Marsh (2003) study by testing how plausibility can 
affect the extent to which misinformation interferes with memory. Using a similar set up as the 
Marsh study, they used stories with either probable, improbable or correct answer choices and 
saw that misinformation was more likely to be absorbed by those who were given an answer with 
higher probability. Another study of plausibility’s role in influencing personal judgements is the 
Mazzoni, Loftus, and Kirsch (2001) study. After having assessed participants’ direct experience 
with improbable things like demon possession versus more probable things like choking, the 
researchers tried to manipulate the subjects into believing the event had occurred to them in 
childhood (Mazzoni, Loftus and Kirsch, 2001). However, since the researchers did not account 
for participants’ prior beliefs in the supernatural, as explained previously by Lewandowsky et al. 
(2012), misinformation effects were diminished by the predispositions of the subjects.   
 Dodd and Bradshaw (1980) manipulated the authority of who presented misinformation 
to determine its effect on memory. Much like in the Loftus & Palmer (1974) study, participants 
watched a video of a car crash and then were presented misinformation from either an 
uninvolved bystander or from the lawyer representing the driver who caused the crash. The 
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participants in the condition that received misinformation from the uninvolved bystander recalled 
more misinformation than the condition who received their misinformation from the lawyer 
(Dodd & Bradshaw, 1980). The researchers hypothesized that the participants believed the 
lawyer was attempting to influence them. Skagerberg & Wright (2008) conducted a similar study 
of authority in which participants watched an event and were given a testimony from a co-
witness of an event, either a child or a police officer. The misinformation effect was only seen in 
the high authority condition, when the police officer gave their testimony. No misinformation 
effect was seen in the low authority condition (Skagerberg & Wright, 2008). Skagerberg and 
Wright (2008) also studied the effect of authority on a line up identification task. Participants 
watched a video of a fake mugging and were presented with seven similar faces to identify the 
culprit. The actual culprit was not included, and participants were told they could say they didn’t 
know, but all subjects made an identification. Subjects were told that either a majority of 
children or a majority of police officers made the same identification as they did, While the 
majority of subjects said it was a difficult task, almost half of the participants who were told that 
they gave the same response as the police officer said they felt good about their incorrect 
identification. Though the effect of authority on memory is now understood, we investigate the 
effect on the personal judgements of others. 
 
METHOD 
Participants 
         All participants (N = 115) were adults over the age of 18 who were enrolled at the 
University of North Georgia in Dahlonega. Participants signed up for the study posted in the 
SONA system provided by the University of North Georgia. Student participants were offered 
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community service hours or research participation hours as required for their psychology course 
requirement. All psychology students have access to the SONA system to complete course 
requirements for Psychology 1101, and these students made up the majority of the participants. 
Procedure 
         Once participants signed up for the study through SONA, the participants completed the 
study online. Subjects were first presented with a consent form which they had to submit before 
moving on to the next page. The form deceived the student participants into believing that the 
were being asked for their input on a who they would like to see lecture at the local library. 
Subjects then watched three videos around five minutes each in length depicting job interviews, 
which they believed were real interviewers for a lecture position at a local library which wanted 
student input on who to hire. Each interviewee was asked the same questions as a control, and 
the responses were scripted to be equal in length and impact. All participants watched the videos 
in the same order. Each interviewee posed as a master’s student applying for a position at the 
local library to lecture on Georgia history. We filmed each “interviewee” from the waist up and 
did not show the interviewer, though both could be heard in the audio. The video showed 
applicants being asked questions about their education, location in relation to the program, and 
their favorite historical figures. Having watched all videos, the participants moved to the next 
page and received one of four notes containing opinions on the interviewees: one containing 
misinformation from the interviewer, one with misinformation from a previous student 
participant, one containing no misinformation from the interviewer, and one with no 
misinformation from a previous student participant. The included notes were all the same except 
in the two conditions where misinformation was provided. In those conditions the subjects were 
told that interviewee one was “spinning around in [her] chair,” highlighting that she was not a 
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professional. The inclusion of the author of the note was intended to create an effect of high and 
low authority, with the student as a low authority source on the interviews, and the professional 
interviewer as a high authority on the capabilities of the interviewee. The subjects were placed 
randomly in one of the four conditions by the last 2 digits of their university issued ID number. 
After reading the opinion note, subjects were told to move to the next page and asked to rate the 
education level, professionalism, personability, well roundedness, and level of fit in the 
university for each candidate on a 5 option Likert scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly 
disagree. We were most concerned with how they rated the professionalism of candidate one in 
each of the experimental conditions. The survey should have taken at least 45 minutes to 
complete before subjects were debriefed and given class service credit for their participation.   
 
RESULTS 
        Dependent measures included ratings of how professional, personable, well-educated and 
well-rounded each interviewee was, in addition to a judgment of their overall fit for the position. 
As these ratings were only very weakly correlated (highest r was .35), they were analyzed 
individually rather than collectively.  A 3 (candidate number) x 2 (misinformation vs. no 
misinformation) by 2 (high credibility source vs. low credibility source) mixed ANOVA was 
thus performed for each dependent measure. The only robust effect was a main effect of 
candidate, as the target candidate (#1), received lower ratings than the other two candidates on 
every measure except perceived education level, regardless of whether misinformation about this 
candidate was provided. These results are summarized in Table 1 below. The effect of the 
candidate factor was significant for perceptions of professionalism (F (2, 108)= 27.05, p < .01), 
personability (F (2, 108)= 20.68, p < .01), fit (F (2, 108)= 24.21, p < .01), and roundedness (F (2, 
108)= 20.41, p < .01).   
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TABLE ONE 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
                                      Candidate 1                Candidate 2                Candidate 3 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
                                      M        SD            M         SD                     M       SD 
Professionalism             3.49     1.05                 4.32     0.62                 4.31     0.85 
Personability                       3.57     0.93                 4.11     0.86                 4.21     0.85 
Fit of Candidate             3.78     0.96                4.35     0.68                 4.38     0.73 
Roundedness                         3.72     0.88                 4.27     0.66                 4.28     0.82 
Education                         4.34     0.71                 4.43     0.59                 4.56     0.73 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
The intended focal test was the 2 (misinformation) x 2 (credibility) interaction with 
respect to candidate #1. However, given that there were no three-way interactions between 
candidate number, misinformation and credibility, it was unsurprising that none of these 2 x 2 
interactions were significant. In fact, this interaction effect for the expected prime outcome 
variable, perceived professionalism, was almost as insignificant as possible, F (1, 109) = .001, p 
> .95. The misinformation by source credibility interaction effect was, however, marginally 
significant for the perceived education level measure, F (2, 108) = 2.82, p = .10. As can be seen 
in Table 2 below, for this rating the target candidate (candidate one) was perceived less favorably 
if misinformation was provided and came from a credible source. 
 
TABLE TWO  
Means (and SDs) for ratings of candidate one’s education level 
 
 No Misinformation High Misinformation 
Low Authority  4.32 (0.65) 4.42 (0.58) 
MISINFORMATION IN AUTHORITY   10 
 
High Authority 4.44 (0.64) 4.21 (0.89) 
 
 
Discussion 
The results found in this study were not predicted by our hypothesis. There were no 
significant main effects of authority on misinformation and no interactions between the variables 
were found. The inconclusive results may have been result of design flaws. Because most 
subjects in the study were first year psychology students only participating for credit, we suspect 
that many of the participants did not read the entire note and could contribute to our lack of 
misinformation effect. In the future, an attention check should be used to eliminate respondents 
who did not pay attention. Also, subtitles should have been included on the videos, as several 
participants later remarked they had a hard time with the audio. It is also possible that the videos 
themselves presented aa problem, as they were student produced and were not pilot tested for 
baseline ratings of the candidate first. The video shown for candidate one should have been less 
distinctive so that the videos should have been rated equally before the presentation of 
misinformation.  Future research should include randomized order of equal videos, so that the 
videos themselves are not causing our main effect, and attention checks to reduce participants 
who flip through the survey. The use of google docs as a collection method created technical 
difficulties in participant navigation and perhaps compromised our study materials.  In the next 
study, the data collection method used should be easier to navigate through and should use page 
breaks instead of new link for each part to prevent participants from feeling discouraged and 
discontinuing the survey.  
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